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On May 3, 1989, an en bane panel of 11
judges of the United States Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit voted seven to
four to order the United States Army to
allow former Staff Sergeant Perry Watkins, a gay man, to reenlist, even though
an Army regulation forbids enlistment of
homosexual persons. 1 Five members of the
panel based their decision on the common
law concept of equitable estoppel, reasoning that because Watkins had served
excellently from his original enlistment in
1967 until the Army refused him reenlistment in 1982, "equity cries out and
demands that the Army be estopped from
refusing to reenlist Watkins on the basis
of his homosexuality."2
Two members of the panel, who had
constituted the majority of a three-judge
panel that issued a similar order on Watkins' behalf on February 10, 1988,3 concurred on the ground that the Army's
regulations excluding lesbians and gay

men from service violated the federal government's obligation of equal protection
of the laws under the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution. 4 The majority of the
1988 panel had concluded that the
Army's regulations discriminated on the
basis of sexual orientation, which the
panel considered to be a suspect classification whose use was not sufficiently justified by the military to withstand judicial
review. The three-judge panel decision,
which was vacated by the en bane decision, was the subject of an earlier article
in this Journal 5 and has already served as
precedent in another long-term court
struggle over the military's regulations:
BenShalom v. Marsh. 6 Still pending before
the 9th Circuit are two other cases
presenting similar issues: High Tech Gays
v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office/ and Pruitt v. Weinberger. 8
At the heart of the battle in these cases
is the question whether sexual orienta-

1 Watkins v. United States, 50 EPD U38,967 (9th Cir.,
May 3, !989). The pertinent regulation is AR 635-200, ch.
IS.
2 Id. at EPD p. 57,155.
3 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 46 EPD U38,063
(9th Cir. 1988).
4 Although the Fifth Amendment does not include the
phrase "equal protection of the laws" found in the 14th
Amendment, the Supreme Court has construed the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to require the
federal government to extend equal ~rotection of the laws to
all persons in the United States on the same basis that binds
the states under the 14th Amendment. See Watkins v. U.S.
Army, 847 F.2d at 1335, n.9.

5 Robinson, Franklin, and Allen, "Watkins v. United
States: New Insights on the Termination of Employees for
Sexual Orientation," LABOR LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 40, No. 2,
February 1989, 117-121.
6 703 F.Supp. 1372, 49 EPD U38,784 (D.Wis. !989). The
7th Circuit heard oral argument in the Army's appeal of
this case on May 18, 1989. The case dates from Miriam
BenShalom's discharge for homosexuality in 1976.
7 668 F.Supp. !361, 45 EPD U37,597 (N.D.Cal. 1987).
This case challenges unequal treatment of lesbian and gay
applicants for industrial security clearances to work on
defense contracts for private employers.
s 625 F.Supp. 625 (C.D.Cal. 1987).

438

July, 1989 Labor Law Journal

tion9 should be treated as a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification for purposes of
equal protection analysis under the 5th
and 14th Amendments. As the Supreme
Court has developed doctrine under these
Amendments, a finding that governmental classifications based on sexual orientation are suspect would mean that federal,
state, and local governments could not
adopt policies adversely affecting lesbians
and gay men unless those policies were
necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to
meet that interest. This test is referred to
as strict scrutiny. If sexual orientation
were found to be quasi-suspect, such classifications would be subject to somewhat
heightened scrutiny, requiring the government to show that the classification is
substantially related to an important governmental interest. If the classification
used by the government does not merit
heightened scrutiny, it will be sustained if
it is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.
The Supreme Court's approach to identifying suspect classifications was most
recently articulated in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 10 in which· the
Court determined that mentally retarded
persons do not constitute either a suspect
or a quasi-suspect classification. Justice
Byron White, writing for the Court,
stated that race, alienage, and national
origin are suspect classifications because
"[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to
the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice
and antipathy-a view that those in the
burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others." 11 Since such discrim9 "Sexual orientation" is a term of art in the social sciences, referring to the gender of sexual object choice. In New
York City's ordinance forbidding discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in employment, it is defined as "heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality." N.Y.C. Admin.
Code, section 8-108.1{3).
10
11

IZ

473 u.s. 432 (1985).
Id. at 440.
!d.
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ination is likely to reflect majoritarian
prejudice and not to be correctable
through the legislative process, the courts
will subject it to strict scrutiny.

Identification of Suspect
Classifications
The Court subjects sex classifications to
heightened scrutiny because "[t]hat factor generally provides no sensible ground
for differential treatment." 12 "[T]he sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society."13 Gender classifications in government policies frequently "reflect
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women." 14 Illegitimacy is
at least quasi-suspect as well, because it
"is beyond the individual's control and
bears 'no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to
society.' " 15
The Court has refused to apply heightened review or strict scrutiny to classifications based on age or mental retardation
because of its view that neither the aged
nor the mentally retarded have been historically singled out for unequal treatment
based
on
"stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of
their abilities." 16 Such unequal treatment
as has existed, according to the Court, has
usually been based on actual characteristics of elderly or retarded persons, and, as
often as not, the unequal treatment was
to provide special protections to those
individuals. Consequently, in the Court's
view, one has little reason to suspect that
prejudice rather than rationality is at
work when the government uses age or
retardation as a classifying characteristic
in a statute, so normal rationality review
13 Id. at 440-41, quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677,686, 5 EPD ~ 8609 (1973) {plurality opinion).
14 Id. at 441.
IS Id. at 441, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,

505 (1976).
16 Id. at 441, quoting Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 12 EPD ~ 10,998 (1976).
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is the relevant test for the reviewing court
to employ in evaluating the constitutionality of the government's policy.
Nonetheless, in City of Cleburne, the
Court struck down a zoning ordinance
which required special approval for the
operation of a group home for the
retarded. The Court found that the justifications articulated for the special
approval requirements were pretextual,
because they would have applied to other
types of group homes for which special
approval was not required, leading the
Court to conclude that the real motivation for the ordinance was dislike or
prejudice against retarded persons based
on stereotypes rather than the reasons
articulated by the city. Thus, rationality
review is not a meaningless formality, at
least as applied by the Court in Cleburne.
This review of the Court's determinations regarding suspect classifications
shows that there is no fixed checklist of
factors, but rather an approach of evaluating each challenged classification with
an eye toward determining whether there
is a substantial likelihood that unfavorable governmental treatment is motivated
by unjustified prejudices and stereotypes.
Various factors may contribute to that
determination, but no one factor is determinative by itself. The reason the Court
applies heightened scrutiny to suspect or
quasi-suspect classifications is that when
such classifications are used, it is likely
that the principle of constitutional equality (that equally situated individuals
must receive equal treatment from their
government) is being violated. For the
government to prevail in such a case, it
must show that the unequal treatment is
objectively justified because the persons
involved are not equal with regard to
characteristics that are relevant for the
legitimate purposes of the governmental
policy at issue.
17 822 F.2d 97, 43 EPD ~ 37,174 (D.C.Cir. 1987). The
1988 Watkins decision also seemed contrary to prior 9th
Circuit precedent for the same reason. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 24 EPD U31,378 (9th Cir. 1980),

440

Caselaw on Policies Excluding
Homosexuals
The 1988 Ninth Circuit decision in
Watkins was particularly significant
because it marked the first time that a
federal appellate court used the Supreme
Court's equal protection doctrines to
declare unequivocally that sexual orientation, i.e., the status of being heterosexual,
homosexual, or bisexual, was a suspect
classification when used to treat homosexuals adversely. The 1988 Watkins decision superficially appeared contrary to a
1987 decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Padula v. Webster, 17 that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's policy
of refusing to hire as special agents persons who were "practicing homosexuals"
did not violate the equal protection
requirement. The Padula decision was
primarily based on the Supreme Court's
1986 ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick 18 that
the practice of "homosexual sodomy"
could be criminalized by the states
without offending the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment because the ability to engage in such sexual conduct was
not, in the Court's view, a fundamental
right and the presumed moral views of a
majority of a state's citizens regarding
such conduct provided a sufficient basis
under rationality review to sustain such
criminal laws.
The D.C. Circuit in Padula declared
that the F.B.I.'s policy, applying as it did
to persons who had engaged in conduct
declared criminal by half the states, was a
rational policy for a national law enforcement agency. So long as the states could
constitutionally criminalize "homosexual
sodomy," the D.C. Circuit opined that it
would be incongruous to subject the
F.B.I.'s policy to heightened or strict scrutiny because "there can hardly be more
palpable discrimination against a class
than making the conduct that defines the
which ruled with regard to superseded Army regulations
premising dismissal on conduct rather than orientation.
18 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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class criminal." 19 The D.C. Circuit's
approach to this issue has since been followed by the Federal Circuit in Woodward v. United States.2o
In its now-vacated 1988 Watkins decision, which has been followed to the letter
on this point by the United States District Court in BenShalom, the panel
majority focused on a key distinction
between the F.B.I. policy challenged in
Padula and the Army policy challenged in
Watkins: the F.B.I.'s alleged policy was a
policy of discrimination based on an
applicant's conduct, while the Army's policy was to discriminate based on orientation or status. Indeed, the Army's
regulation would allow continued military
service by heterosexual persons who had
engaged in homosexual conduct, but
would exclude homosexuals who were
entirely celibate or engaged solely in heterosexual conduct. While Hardwick settles, at least for now, that the government
can outlaw certain same-sex conduct
without offending the Due Process Clause,
differential treatment based on status
presents a different issue, as the Supreme
Court itself recognized in 1962 when it
ruled that California could not impose
criminal sanctions on a person for the
status of being addicted to controlled substances without violating the. Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment, even though there was no
constitutional bar to criminalizing the use
of controlled substances.21
By analogy to this distinction, Judge
Norris of the Ninth Circuit contends in

Watkins 22 that the Hardwick decision is
not relevant to constitutional evaluation
of the Army's policy. For one thing, the
Hardwick decision concerns only conduct
of the type defined by Georgia as "sodomy" (anal or oral intercourse), and there
is a wide range of same-sex contact that
falls short of that definition and is not
necessarily subject to criminalization
under the authority of that decision. (District Judge Henderson makes the same
point in his decision in High Tech Gays,23
which held unconstitutional certain barriers to lesbian and gay applicants
obtaining security clearances for work on
defense contracts. Judge Henderson concluded that sexual orientation was at least
a quasi-suspect classification requiring
heightened scrutiny.) Furthermore, Judge
Norris demonstrates that the Army's policy does not define the excluded class in
terms of conduct, but rather in terms of
orientation, thereby leaving open for evaluation the question of whether such a
status-based exclusion meets the criteria
for designation as a suspect classification.24

822 F.2d at 103.
871 F.2d 1068, 49 EPD U38,877 (Fed.Cir., March 29,
1989).
21 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Second Circuit has also recently noted this distinction in Falk
v. Secretary of the Army, 870 F.2d 941 (March 30, 1989),
commenting that a rule that would "penalize military personnel for their status as homosexuals ... may be constitutionally infirm." See also, Sunstein, "Sexual Orientation and
the Constitution: ANote on the Relationship Between Due
Process and Equal Protection," 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161,
1162 (1988).
22 Judge Norris's concurring opinion in the May 3 en bane
decision essentially replicates his opinion for the 1988 panel.
50 EPD ~ 38,967 at pp. 57,156-57,173. Concurring Judge

Canby stated his total agreement with Judge Norris's equal
protection analysis. Id. at p. 57,173.
23 668 F.Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
24 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 50 EPD U38,967 at pp.
57,158-57,160 (May 3, 1989).
25 An alternative analysis would suggest that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is merely a variation
of sex discrimination, and thus entitled to heightened scrutiny as such. See Chang, "Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent," 72 Iowa L. Rev. 753, 825-26, 868-70 (1987).
This contention comes up against caselaw holding that
sexual orientation discrimination is not covered by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, such as DeSantis v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 19 EPD U9271
(9th Cir. 1979).

19

20
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Sexual Orientation as a Suspect
Classification
Once the tests described in City of
Cleburne are applied, it becomes clear
that some form of heightened scrutiny
should be given to governmental policies
that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. 25 The history of prejudice,
and indeed violence, against persons on
the basis of their sexual orientation is long

441

and well-documented. In the numerous
cases challenging the exclusionary policies
of the military, courts have found again
and again that the personnel involved had
extraordinarily good records, indicating
that their sexual orientation was not necessarily a disqualifying factor. Watkins,
through a military career of 14 years, had
been repeatedly promoted and rated
highly, and his various commanding
officers had testified in favor of his retention in the service.
Furthermore, although scientists are
not unanimous on the point, there is a
growing consensus that sexual orientation
as such is a fairly fixed component of
personal identity, largely impervious to
change. 26 Here, the status vs. conduct distinction comes into play again; it seems
that therapists can in some cases induce
changes in sexual behavior by individuals
highly motivated to change, but that
underlying sexual orientation is not
changeable. As such, sexual orientation, in
common with illegitimacy, would be a suspect classification because it "is beyond
the individual's control and bears 'no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society.' " 27

vant to legitimate government goals. 28 If
the objective of the Army in maintaining
its regulation is to advance the national
interest and security of the United States,
the regulation is counterproductive
because it deprives the military of the
services of an excellent soldier such as
Perry Watkins. The regulation seems
based on categorical dislike rather than on
an individualized assessment of aptitude
for service, 29 and the justifications
advanced by the military ring hollow, in
Judge Norris's view, because they appear
based on the presumed prejudice and dislike of homosexual persons by society,
rather than on proof of harm to the
national interest or security from allowing
gay people to serve.30

Given these factors, Judge Norris concluded that when government uses sexual
orientation as a classification for purposes
of discrimination or exclusion, there is
good reason to suspect that the policy is
motivated by prejudice and stereotype,
rather than by objective justification rele-

The 1989 en bane panel resolved the
matter without reaching these constitutional issues by determining that the
Army's treatment of Watkins from 1967
through 1982 merited invocation of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. But
implicit in the panel's decision was a
rejection of the Army's proffered justifications for excluding homosexuals from the
service, because one of the tests for the
appropriateness of raising an estoppel
against the government is whether the
court's order will prejudice the public
interest. The court resolved this question
decisively against the government on the
basis of Watkin's excellent military record
and the obvious disservice to the country

26 For summaries of current thought on this subject, see
Isay, Being Homosexual: Gay Men and Their Development
(1989); Lewes, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Male Homosexuality (1988); Money, Gay, Straight, and In-Between:
The Sexology of Erotic Orientation (1988); Green, The SissyBoy Syndrome and the Development of Homosexuality
(1987); Weinrich, Sexual Landscapes: Why We Are What
We Are, Why We Love Whom We Love (1987); Bell, Weinberg & Hammersmith, Sexual Preference: Its Development
in Men and Women (1981); Marmor, Homosexual Behavior:
A Modern Reappraisal (1980).
27 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, quoting Mathews v. Lucas,
427
190 (1976).
28 There is considerable support in legal literature for this
conclusion. See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 248
n.S2 (1980); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1616

(2d ed. 1988); Note, "An Argument for the Application of
Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications
Based on Homosexuality," 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797 (1984);
Note, "The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification," 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 1285 (1985).
29 This is well illustrated by another case now in litigation, where a cadet at the Naval Academy who had never
engaged in any sexual contact with another man was dismissed for "lack of aptitude" after confessing his homosexual orientation to a superior officer. The cadet in question
was near the top of his class and honored as a corps commander. Some lack of aptitude! Steffan v. Cheney, Civ.
Action No. 88-3669 (D.D.C., filed December 29, 1988).
JO Watkins v. U.S. Army, 50 EPD U38,967 at pp.
57,170-57,173 (May 3, 1989).

u.s.
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of excluding such an outstanding soldier
from further service in the Army. 31

Protective Policies
The final word has yet to be written on
the equal protection issue as it applies to
the employment rights of lesbians and gay
men by governmental bodies. However,
many public and private sector employers
are already bound by administrative or
legislative policies and common law principles which affect their discretion regarding treatment of lesbian and gay
employees. Because these are rarely
articulated expressly in statutes, they are
not as well known or as easy to research as
the familiar statutory prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, national origin, or age.
A brief review of these policies is useful in
placing the outcome of the equal protection debate in proper perspective for
employers.
In the public sector, it is reasonably
well settled that various constitutional
provisions other than the Equal Protection Clause provide protections for lesbian
and gay public servants. As early as 1969,
federal courts took the position that due
process requirements preclude dismissal
of most civil servants for "homosexuality"
without a showing that their conduct has
impaired their ahility to perform their
jobs. 32 Pursuant to the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978,33 the federal Office
of Personnel Management issued a Policy
Statement in 1980 that sexual orientation
would not be the basis for removal of
federal employees without a showing that
the individual's conduct had impaired the
31

Watkins v. U.S. Army, Id.

3, 1989).

at pp. 57,152·57,155 (May

Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C.Cir. 1969).
P.L. 95454, Title II, codified in pertinent part at 5
U.S.C. sections 7511·14.
34 Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); National Gay Task Force v.
Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270, 34
EPD ff 34,357 (lOth Cir. 1984), aff'd by equally divided
Court, 470 U.S. 903, 36 EPD ff 35,065 (1985).
35 For a current list, see Leonard, Gay & Lesbian Rights
Protections in the U.S.: An Introduction to Gay and Lesbian
32
33
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efficiency of the service. Federal courts
have also held that the First Amendment
would protect public employees who
speak out in support of equal rights for
lesbian and gay people. 34 These protections are amplified at the state level by
gubernatorial executive orders and statutes in about a dozen jurisdictions. 35 At
the county and municipal levels, ordinances and executive orders in 76 jurisdictions forbid such discrimination.36
Lesbian and gay employees in the private sector have less protection from discrimination, but more than is commonly
supposed. For one thing, labor arbitrators
who have ruled on the subject seem to
agree that homosexuality, including private sexual conduct, does not constitute
just cause for discharge under the typical
collective bargaining agreement. 37 For
another, developing common law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine
are likely to result in protecting lesbian
and gay employees from discharge when
their conduct has not affected their ability to do their jobs. In particular, the
express contract exceptions premised on
oral or written assurances of job security
recognized in a majority of states and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
which is growing in acceptance, would
result in many employees having common
law remedies for discharges premised
solely on their sexual orientation or offduty sexual conduct.38
There is also a growing body of statutory protection. Wisconsin became the
first state to enact a statutory prohibition
on public and private sector employment
discrimination 'on the basis of sexual oriCivil Rights (1989), available from the National Gay &
Lesbian Task Force, 1517 U St., N.W., Washington, D.C.

20009.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Hughes Air Corp., 73 L.A. 148 (Barsamian,
1979).
38 See, generally, Leonard, A New Common Law of
Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 631 (1988). Of
course, adoption of just cause discharge statutes such as
that recently enacted in Montana would similarly restrict
employers.
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entation in 1982. 39 Similar legislative proposals have been making headway in
several states. In California, the legislature passed such a bill several years ago,
which was vetoed by the governor. The
California Supreme Court ruled in 1979
that regulated public utilities could not
discriminate against employees known or
suspected to be gay, 40 and the state's
Attorney General has opined that existing
civil rights laws in that state may provide
equivalent protection to many employees.41 In Massachusetts, a bill passed both
houses of the legislature in 1987, but final
enactment was prevented by last minute
procedural maneuvers by a few opponents
in leadership positions. In 1989, new
efforts at enactment were succcessful in
at least one legislative house in Iowa and
Massachusetts.
Local governments throughout the
United States have legislated to ban private sector employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. A count by
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
at the end of 1988 showed such laws in
effect in 41·municipalities and three counties, including five of the ten most populous cities in the United States. 42
Contrary to the views of some that the
AIDS epidemic would slow the enactment
of such local laws, 20 were enacted since
AIDS began to emerge as a subject of
public discussion in the early 1980s,
including most notably in New York City
(1986) and Chicago (1988). Furthermore,
lesbian or gay employees who encounter
discrimination because of employer or coemployee fear of AIDS may find protection under disability discrimination
laws. 43
39

Leonard, supra note 36.

Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 892 (Calif. 1979).
40

Attorney General Opinion No. 85404.
Leonard, Gay & Lesbian Rights Protections, supra.
43 E.g., Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J.Super. 370, 549 A.2d 900
(1987) (housing discrimination against gay men due to fear
of AIDS violates state law against handicap discrimination).
41

Conclusion
If the federal courts finally resolve the
Equal Protection debate in favor of
heightened scrutiny for governmental
classifications that disadvantage persons
because of their sexual orientations, public employers will have further reason to
reconsider existing policies or biases
against lesbian and gay people as employees or clients of public programs. Heightened scrutiny for such classifications
seems justified under the approach developed by the Supreme Court and most
recently described in City of Cleburne.
Cases now pending in the 7th and 9th
Circuits may provide the vehicles for
Supreme Court consideration of the issue
early in the 1990s. 44

Regardless how the Equal Protection
issue is resolved, however, there is an
existing growing body of law restricting
the discretion of employers in dealing
with lesbian and gay employees. Consequently, employers in both the public and
private sectors cannot assume that lesbian and gay employees necessarily lack
legal recourse for discrimination or discharge which is not objectively defensible.
The continued trend of enactment of
protective local laws and the developing
federal caselaw seem part of a more general move by society to recognize the central role of employment in people's lives,
which may eventuate in general protection against discharge without just cause.
Until such time, however, employers
would be well advised to educate themselves about the existing restrictions on
their discretion to discharge lesbian and
gay employees. Furthermore, employers
may well take a factual lesson from the
case of Staff Sergeant Perry Watkins.
44 BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F.Supp. 1372, 49 EPD
U38,784 (D.Wis. 1989); High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 668 F.Supp. 1361, 45 EPD
U37,597 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Pruitt v. Weinberger, 625
F.Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1987).

42
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There are millions of lesbian and gay
employees in this country who render valuable and faithful service to their employers, and whose sexual orientation should

not serve as a barrier to their continued
contributions in the workplace.

[The End]

Corporation Charged with Manslaughter
A corporation is sufficiently a "person" to be charged with manslaughter,
the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled in remanding People v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 1989 OSHD ff 28,467) for trial. Lower courts erred in
refusing to bind over the corporate defendant on an involuntary manslaughter
charge for the death of an employee who was overcome by Gensolv-D (Freon)
fumes. Conflicting evidence on the corporation's negligence created an issue of
fact to be resolved by a jury. The solvent was used to clean the interior of
army tanks, aild the worker was killed when he attempted to drive a recently
sprayed tank. There was conflicting evidence regarding whether General
Dynamics had a procedure for safely cleaning the tanks and whether safety
bulletins containing the procedure were seen by workers. A lower court's
dismissal of a charge of willful violation of a Michigan OSH ventilation
standard was affirmed, since the head and shoulders of the employee remained
above the level of the hatch cover, outside the tank interior.
Employer Convicted of Homicide by Reckless Conduct
A jury verdict convicting a corporate employer of homicide by reckless
conduct was affirmed by a Wisconsin Circuit Court of Appeals Wisconsin v.
Shoreline Support Corp., 1989 OSHD ff 28,505). An employee fell to his death
from a 75-foot cliff while working unsupervised. The jury's conclusion that
failure to provide trained supervision for an inexperienced employee constituted recklessness was a reasonable determination, the court found. The court
rejected the employer's argument that state criminal action was precluded
because an action had also been instituted under the federal OSH Act.
Previous state court decisions have established that OSHA regulations do not
preempt criminal prosecution for reckless homicide.

Equal Employment Opportunity
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